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Abstract 
The  distributional  impact  of  the  structural  pension  reform  in  Latin  American 
countries has been largely absent in the economic debate. However, this reform may 
widen  inequality  in  old-age  and  reduce  welfare.  In  this  paper  we  study  the 
consequences of implementing a multi-pillar system in one of these countries. We take 
advantage  of  available  administrative  records  for  Peruvian  workers  to  estimate 
inequality in pensions, pension debt and welfare. Overall, our results show that the 
pension debt and inequality can be substantially reduced without welfare losses. 
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1. Introduction 
Following  the  Chilean  pension  reform  of  1981,  a  number  of  Latin  American  countries 
transformed during the 90’s their public pension systems into private individual capitalization 
systems. Some countries completely replaced their old pension system by a system based on 
individual capitalization and privately managed (Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador 
and  Mexico).  Others  kept  the  public  system  which  competes  with  the  new  private  system 
(Colombia and Peru) whilst other countries assigned the role of first pillar to the public system 
and  created  a  private  system  as  a  second pillar (Argentina,  Costa  Rica  and  Uruguay)  in  an 
integrated  system.  These  models  are  categorized  as  substitutive,  parallel  and  mixed, 
respectively (Arenas de Mesa & Mesa-Lago, 2006).         
The emphasis of this reform was on the spillovers in the financial markets, public debt and 
growth. Furthermore, economic research and debate are concentrated in those issues and some 
important aspects such as fees levels, competition and enrolment rates. As it is stressed in Arza 
(2008)  and  Barr  &  Diamond  (2009)  there  is  little  analysis  on  distributional  and  welfare 
consequences.  However,  these  effects  may  be  large  and  even  intensify  inequality  in  those 
countries; specially if we take in account that only a small fraction of population is covered by 
the pension system (see last column of table 1).    
[Table 1 about here] 
Given  that  the  pension  based  on  individual  capitalization  is  a  direct  function  of  labour 
income, the reformed pension system reproduces labour income differences into pensions. In 
this sense, the potential amplification of inequality during old-age may be approximated by the 
difference between the Gini coefficients for labour income and pre-reform pensions (see table 
1).  In  almost  all countries  there  is  a  threat of wider  pension  inequality,  with  Bolivia,  Peru, 
Argentina  and  Colombia  being  the  countries  that  might  face  the  most  dramatic  change  in 
inequality during old-age.  
By  combining  inequality  in  pension  coverage  and  benefits  computed  under  individual 
capitalization in some hypothetical pension designs, Arza (2008) also stresses the transmission 
and exacerbation of inequality of the Latin American pension systems. Although that exercise 
and our previous table highlight the potential distributional consequences of pension reforms in 
Latin America, it is still necessary to analyse more precisely inequality in pensions and how this 
interplays with other policy objectives. As we may infer from the large Government pension 
transfers (table 1), the reduction of the actuarial liability of pensions must be a key objective for 
policy-makers. Making clear the trade-offs between inequality, actuarial liability and welfare 
stresses the different roles of pension policies and it might be more appealing for policy-makers. 
However, this is quite demanding on specific information such as administrative records of 
workers and pensioners, which is hardly available and disclosed by governmental authorities. 3 
 
Although it would be ideal to make this analysis in a cross-country fashion, one study case may 
provide enough insights to highlight the distributional consequences of pension reform and 
policies aimed  to  alleviate  it.  In  this  way,  we  take  advantage of  unique administrative  data 
samples of Peruvian workers to measure the consequences of the adoption of a multi-pillar 
pension system in inequality, welfare and actuarial liability. 
In the next section we outline the Peruvian pension system, and then the reform proposal is 
presented together with the methodology to estimate pensions and actuarial liability. Section 4 
is devoted to present and discuss the effects of the reform on the actuarial liability, inequality 
and welfare; and then, the paper concludes. 
 
2. An outlook of the Peruvian pension system 
Peru created in 1993 the Private Pension system (SPP), which is a system based on individual 
capitalization, without dismantling its old defined benefit system (the National Pension System, 
SNP)1. Workers have to choose only one of these two systems. If SNP is chosen, the insure d is 
able to shift to SPP later on, but the contrary is not permitted. An individual who chooses the 
SPP, must also enrol in one of the firms that administrate pension funds (AFP). If an insured 
moves from SNP to SPP, the State entitles a recognition bond  (BR) in order to compensate for 
the contributions made to SNP, but only if some legal requirements are fulfilled. 
The insured of the SPP (those who previously belonged to the SNP) realized that the 
expected or already received benefits in the SPP were lower than those in the SNP. Indeed, they 
could obtain at least a minimum pension in the SNP, which is not  legally guaranteed to the 
majority of insured in the SPP. The insured shifted to SPP expecting to receive a large BR and 
capitalize more contributions with the aim to reach better pensions. However, these insured 
either failed to fulfil legal requirements to receive a BR or its final value was much under 
insured’s expectation. Additionally, a large number of these individuals were not young enough 
to capitalize their contributions; and worst, they could acquire an early or normal retirement 
benefit in the SNP if they had remained there. In order to correct these undesirable effects, there 
have  been  many  adjustments  in  the  pension  system;  for  instance,  the  recent  Law  28991 
“desafiliación”  (under  restricted  circumstances  the  insured  can  return  to  the  SNP)  and  the 
creation of special regimes of retirement.   
These  costly  fiscal  adjustments  may  satisfy  in  some  way  the  expectations  of  the  SPP’s 
insured, who were previously enrolled in the SNP, to receive benefits similar to those in the 
SNP. However, there are two groups of insured who potentially would demand better benefits, 
and hence more fiscal resources. The first one is the group of low-income insured of the SPP 
who are not able to capitalize enough to reach a pension that meets their needs in old-age. 
Although in practice there is no minimum pension in the SPP, it is expected that insured of the 4 
 
SPP still look at the SNP’s minimum pension as a reference point to demand higher pensions. 
The other group is composed of the current and future insured of the SNP. The creation of the 
SPP attracted a considerable number of insured from the SNP and new workers who preferred 
to enrol in the new system. This, in turn, weakened the financial sustainability of the SNP. Under 
current parameters, the SNP’s dependency ratio should be 4.4 contributors for each pensioner 
in order to keep the system balanced; however, this ratio is only 1.32. This explains the large 
actuarial  deficiency  (when  the  actuarial  liability  is  greater  than  the  present  value  of 
contributions), which amounts to US$26 billion, i.e. 23% of GDP.  Note this considerable debt 
corresponds only to pensioners and insured of the SNP, who represent a small fraction  of 
Peruvian population (7.4% of total population).  
The reform has generated a considerable debt. Apart from the large actuarial  deficiency in 
the SNP, there is US$4,700 million  in current terms corresponding to recognition bonds; and 
US$2,137 million in actuarial terms due to the implementation of Law 28891 (MEF, 2008 & 
2007). One could consider that fiscal spending on pensions is worth due to its positive effects on 
preventing old people falling into poverty, but this is not necessarily the case in Peru.  Only 
salaried employees of the formal sector are obligated to enrol in the pension system, which 
means that self-employed, employers and other types (in the formal or informal sector) can 
choose voluntary enrol or not. Since the informal sector in Peru is huge (55% of labour force in 
2007 (ILO, 2009))  and incomes are low, pension enrolment  may  not  be  a choice for these 
workers; hence the enrolment rate is small. It means that the  public expenditure on pensions 
has no effect on preventing poverty for an important fraction of the population.  
The creation of the SPP broke the principle of solidarity, a key element for redistribution and 
financing of pensions. Before reform, the system design allowed to finance pensions from richer 
to poorer, young to elder, he althy to disabled, etc. Looking for policy options, we favour the 
recommendations made by the World Bank (Holzmann et al, 2005; World Bank, 1994) to create 
a multi-pillar pension system, based on three pillars: i) a mandatory public pillar, ii) a funded 
pillar with mandatory individual capitalization accounts, and iii) a funded pillar with voluntary 
individual accounts. Under the first pillar, all insured receive a minimum pension. The second 
pillar allows insured to capitalize contributions according to hi s income level. The goal of the 
third one is to allow the insured to further raise his expected pension if he is able to save more. 
The next section develops a proposal to create a multi-pillar pension system in Peru. 
 
3. A reform proposal 
3.1 Description 
We  propose  to  implement  a  multi-pillar  pension  system  by  merging  the  SNP and  SPP.  The 
number of years contributed to any system up to the reform date must be accounted for the 5 
 
evaluation of the entitlement of a minimum pension. Additionally, the insured of the SPP are 
allowed to keep their pension balance. In the new system each insured has to contribute a rate α 
from his wage to his individual account and a rate β to the solidarity fund. The aim of this fund is 
financing the minimum pension scheme. The requisites to obtain a minimum pension are the 
same as in the SNP: i) 20 years of contributions (to SNP and/or SPP), and ii) the wage used to 
calculate the contribution must be, at least, equal to the minimum wage. 
  At the retirement age, the pension is computed with the pension balance. If the pension is 
lower than the minimum pension, then additional resources are added from the solidarity fund 
until the pension equals the minimum pension value. This means that this guarantee is targeted 
and redistributive.  
  In addition, the reform is intended to reduce the actuarial deficiency, which in turn may 
improve fiscal spending allocation. The State has to assign significant resources to pay pension 
obligations,  which  might  otherwise  be  used  for  other  social  programs3. It means that tax 
revenues -that are paid by pension enrolled and not enrolled workers- are used to pay pensions, 
which reinforces inequality (Arza, 2008). This is particularly critical due to the  fact that the 
group of enrolled workers is much more advantaged than the non-enrolled. The former work in 
the formal sector, have higher and more stable incomes and better education, etc. 
  The simulation of the reform is made by estimating the pensions of all insured (in the SNP, 
SPP and the hypothetical multi-pillar system) and then, computing the corresponding actuarial 
liability. We use different values for α and β in order to obtain different scenarios of reform, and 
for comparison reasons we must choose values for α and β such that α + β = 0.104. Thus, we 
obtain different pension distributions and actuarial debt, which allows us to make welfare and 
inequality comparisons. In the simulations, the enrolment of new workers is not considered but 
we allow for the death of insured according to official mortality tables. 
3.2 Data 
One important advantage of this study is the availability of administrative records. We use two 
representative samples of the insured registered up to December 2006 in the SPP and SNP; so 
the simulations are made to that date. The samples contain information on wage, age, gender, 
age  of  enrolment  in  the  SPP,  pension  balance,  BR  value  and  its  corresponding  number  of 
contributions.  The samples of the SPP and SNP are random and stratified according to gender 
and  age  group  (in  the  SPP,  the  age  of  enrolment  is  an  additional  stratum).  After  dropping 
records with inconsistent and missing information, the sample size in the SPP and SNP is 31,719 
and 26,168 individuals, respectively5. Once simulations are computed for the samples, we use 




3.3 Computation of pensions 
The pensions (
snp
ik P ) in the SNP are computed according to its pension rules, i.e. taking into 
account the minimum and maximum pension values, and base and marginal replacement rates. 
In the SPP and multi-pillar system, the computation of pensions follows a simple capitalization 
process.  The  number  of  contributions  made  to  any  system  is  of  special  interest  for  the 
entitlement to minimum pension6. Expression 1 to 4 calculate the number of contributions and 
pensions in the system j (j=SNP, SPP and multi-pillar (MIX)). The subscripts i and k included in 
the variables refer to a particular individual and his age at December 2006, respectively.  kj 
indicates the age at which the individual enrolled in the pension system j. 
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ik A : Number of contributed years between kj and 65 (the retirement age). 
 
j t0  : Overall density of contributions between kj and k.  
 
j t1  : Overall density of contributions between k and 65. 
BR
ik A : Number of years contributed to the SNP recorded in BR. 
 
  The values for the densities of contributions must be between 0% and 100%. Since it is not 
possible  to  estimate  densities  for  each  individual,  we  must  assume  overall  densities  of 
contributions  for  each  system j (
j t0 and 
j t1 ). According to expression 4, we assume  that the 
insured will contribute at least 20 years (if his age allows it) in order to reach the minimum 
amount of years needed to be entitled a minimum pension. 
  The computation of the pension in the SPP follows a monthly capitalization process: 
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ik P      : Retirement pension for individual i and age k.    
ik Y          : Monthly wage of individual i and age k. There are 14 payments a year. 
0 CIC       : Existing balance in the individual capitalization account (at December 2006).  
ik BR        : Recognition bond, at December 2006 value. 
 r ~            : Pension fund yearly return rate.   
y CRU , 65  




ik d  is a measure more individualized for the density of contributions between current age 
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  The annuity price is computed as follows:  
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where: 
x p 65 , 65 : Probability of survival from age 65 to 65+x, according to official mortality table. 
M           : Maximum survival age according to official mortality table. 
r ˆ            : Annuity discount rate.   
θspp        : Percentage of the husband’s pension that the widow will receive. 
i y y q ,     
: Probability of survival from age y to age y+i for the widow. 
 
  Finally, considering that 
mix P min  is the minimum pension guarantee in the multi-pillar system, 
the final value of the pension (
mix
ik P ) is computed as: 
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3.4 Computation of the actuarial liability 
The  actuarial  liability  is  the  capital  needed  to  address  the  payment  of  current  and  future 
pensions.  This  payment  is  contingent  to  the  death  date  of  current  and  future  insured  and 
pensioners. In a defined benefit system like the SNP and in a multi-pillar system as we propose, 
these payments should be compared with the present value of contributions in order to know 
the final balance. 
Actuarial liability for insured of the SNP: 
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And the total actuarial liability in SNP is: 
snp snp
snp RA RA RA 65 65                                                            (18) 
where: 
snp
ik RA  :   Actuarial reserve for an individual i of age k. 
snp
k RA  :   Actuarial reserve for all individuals of age k.
     
 
k N       :   Number of individuals of age k
 
in the sample.
     
 
snp RA 65 :   Actuarial reserve for all individuals of age k≤65. 
 r          :   Discount rate. 9 
 
 
According to equations 15-17, insured older than 65 years retire immediately. Although not 
explicit in equation 18, we also consider in our calculations of  snp RA  the actuarial liability of the 
survivors of the insured who die before retirement age. 
 Actuarial liability for insured of the SPP: 
Although the minimum pension (
spp P min ) of the SPP is restricted to a small fraction of its insured, 
we must quantify the corresponding actuarial liability of these future payments: 
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where 
spp Smin takes value 1 if 
spp
ik
spp P P min  and the insured fulfils legal requirements to obtain a 
minimum pensions; and zero, otherwise. 
Present value of contributions for insured of the SNP: 
Since we retire workers at 65, the only contributors are the 64 years old or younger insured. 
The present value of contributions (
snp VP ) is the expected discounted value of all contributions 












r p Y d VP
65
1 1





snp VP VP                                                                           (26) 
Actuarial liability for insured of the new multi-pillar system: 
This computation is similar to that carried out for the SPP’s insured. We also assume that the 
multi-pillar system provides a minimum pension for survivors, and that they always meet the 
legal requirements to obtain this benefit.  
  Finally, we consider that the insured older than 65 (at December 2006) receive the larger 
pension  resulting  from  the  comparison  between  the  multi-pillar  pension  and  the  original 
system’s pension. This assumption is necessary to not affect the rights of workers who have 
already reached retirement age. 
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We need to use a unique set of mortality tables in the computation of the actuarial liabilities for 
comparative purposes. We adopt the official tables currently used in the SPP, i.e. the RV-2004 
for pension holders and the B-85 for beneficiaries. It is assumed that each insured has a spouse 
(men are 4 years older than women7). 
Interest rates 
Since our simulation of actuarial liabilities implicitly assumes no inflation, the pension fund 
return rate is assumed free of price changes. Furthermore, this should be a long-term rate given 
the long period a person contributes. The estimation of pensions and actuarial liability is very 
sensitive to the value of the return rate. While in the 15 years of operation of the SPP, the 
average  real  return  is  about  9%,  it  is  best  to  assume  a  conservative  value.  Therefore,  let’s 
assume  r ~ = 6%. This same value is assumed in other studies that show long-term projections 
for the Peruvian pension system, as is the case of Moron and Carranza (2003) and Bernal et al 
(2008).  
According to available data, the gross average of the annuity’s discount interest rate ranges 
between  4.7%  and  4.9%8.  Furthermore,  the  interest  rate  specified  in  the  regulation  for 
evaluating the entitlement of some benefits (e.g. regul ar and special early retirement and 
minimum pension in the SPP) is 4.6%. Therefore, given that there is not much discrepancy 
among all these values, we assume r ˆ =4.6% in our simulations. 
  The  discount  interest  (r)  rate  is  needed  to  find  the  present  value  of  a  life  annuity,  and 
consistently we must use the same interest to estimate the actuarial liability and present value 
of contributions, hence  r r ˆ 4.6%. Other authors that estimate actuarial liabilities for Latin 
American countries use similar rates; Zvinieni and Packard (2002) use a discount rate of 4%, 
Holzmann et al (2004) use values between 2% and 5%. A discount rate of 4% is used by other 
authors that estimate actuarial liabilities in Peru (MEF, 2008 and Bernal et al, 2008). 
Parameters of the pension systems 
According to available information, the monthly average density of contributions in the SPP (the 
quantity of contributors over the total of insured, excluding those who never contributed to the 
SPP)  was  51.1%  between  1998  and  2008.  In  the  SNP,  the  average  yearly  ratio  between 
contributors and insured was 47.1% between 2000 and 2007.   Given  the  unavailability  of 11 
 
information on contribution density neither at individual level nor for future and past periods, it 
is assumed for simplicity that all insured of the SPP, SNP and multi-pillar had and will have a 
density contribution of 50%9. This assumption is not far from more accurate figures estimated 
in other funded pension systems such as in Chile and Argentina (Arena s de Mesa et al, 2008; 
Bertranou and Sánchez, 2003). 
  The minimum pension for the insured in the SPP and SNP is S/.484 a month. The SNP also 
offers a minimum pension for beneficiaries (the insured’s spouse), which is S/.315. All these 
same values are assumed for the multi-pillar system. Moreover, the maximum pension offered 
in the SNP is S/.1,000. In the SNP, the widow receives a survival pension equivalent to 50% of 
the spouse’s pension (θsnp=50%); although the widower may receive a survival pension under 
some conditions, we assume that he does not receive it. In the SPP and multi-pillar system, 
θspp=θmix=42% for widows and widowers. 
 
4. Effects of the reform 
4.1 Actuarial liability 
The estimation of the actuarial liability is extremely sensitive to assumptions, pension rules and 
parameters. The evolution of the SNP’s actuarial liability not only responds to the dynamic of 
pensions, incomes, contributors and pensioners, but also to some changes in the estimation 
methodology10 (see table 2).   
 [Table 2 about here] 
  Moreover, in table 2 there are striking differences between the results of our estimation and 
ONP’s. The main reasons for this discrepancy are i) our discount rate is 4.6%, while the ONP 
uses 4%; ii) we assume a contribution density of 50%, which implies an average of 20.9 years 
contributed in our SNP sample; this sharply contrasts with the 33 years supposed by the ONP; 
iii) the mortality table used is the SPP’s RV-2004 ; iv) in our sample, we do not include the 
insured with missing information on age; while the ONP supposes they are 41 and 43 years old; 
v) we assume the age difference between spouses is 4 years while the ONP assumes 7 years. It is 
worth mentioning that the simulation uses the same exchange rate by ONP in 2006, i.e. S/.3.194 
per Dollar. 
  The actuarial liability for current SNP’s pensioners is not estimated because the proposed 
reform  will  not  affect  current  pensions.  Accordingly,  the  concept  of  “pension  debt”  will  be 
henceforth the difference between the actuarial liability of insured workers and the present 
value of their contributions. This is precisely the concept expressed in the last column of Table 
2. Our estimation is US$9,704 billion (10.4% of GDP), not far from ONP’s. We must add to this 
amount the actuarial liability corresponding to SPP’s minimum pensions in order to obtain the 12 
 
debt of the pension system as a whole. Thus, before any reform, the total pension debt amounts 
US$10,296 (see table 3).  
[Table 3 about here] 
  Table  3  shows  the  reform’s  effect  on  pension  debt  under  different  combinations  of 
contribution rates α and β, subject to α+β=10%. Each column exhibits the estimated value of the 
pension debt and the amount of savings due to reform. For instance, in the first column, 9% of 
salary is contributed to the solidarity fund and only 1% to the individual account; i.e. the multi-
pillar system would be close to work as a defined benefit system. In this scenario, the pension 
debt is reduced to only US$441 million, so the State may save up to US$9,855 million, which is 
equivalent  to  10.5%  of  GDP.  Although  this  is  an  extreme  scenario,  it  is  instructive.  If  the 
contribution rate to individual account is higher, as shown in the other columns of the table, the 
State may still obtain substantial savings. The other extreme case is shown in the last column of 
table 3. In that scenario the multi-pillar system would be similar to the SPP with only a small 
contribution rate to the solidarity fund (1%), although with a guaranteed minimum pension 
scheme.  This  alternative  slightly  raises  the  pension  debt  by  US$245  million  instead  of 
generating savings. 
  A social planner only interested in reducing the pension debt will chose the scenario with the 
lowest contribution  rate  for  the  individual  account.  Although  this  choice might  lead  to  less 
inequality among pensioners, it could also imply some adverse consequences in welfare. The 
next section is devoted to these issues.   
 4.2 Equity and welfare 
Apart from reducing the pension debt, the reform also has distributional and welfare effects. 
The effect on the distribution of pensions is quantified by the Gini coefficient (G). While this 
indicator is widely used to measure income inequality, its normative characteristics are not 
explicit. In contrast, the Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970) is built on an explicit ethical basis 
since it takes into account the inequality aversion of the planner (Lambert et al, 2008). This 
index is defined as I(e); and e is the parameter of inequality aversion of the social planner. 
  In the context of pension systems, the Atkinson index may be interpreted as the fraction of 
national income of pensions which can be lost in order to achieve equality in the distribution of 
pensions.  Or  in  other  words,  it is  the  price  that  the  planner  is  willing  to  pay  for  complete 
equality. If e 0, the planner is neutral to inequality and the index tends to zero, thus it is not 
willing to sacrifice pension amounts in exchange for perfect equality. However, a planner more 
averse to inequality exhibits an index that tends to 1, so that it tolerates large losses in the 
pensions in exchange for greater equality. 
  With regard to the effects on welfare, the planner should be able to build social welfare 
functions (SWF) with the resulting pension distributions from the reform, and then rank them. 13 
 
As pointed in Lambert (2001), the SWF must be increasing in the income mean and decreasing 
in the inequality index. Thus, if µ indicates the pension mean, then the SWF built with the Gini 
coefficient and Atkinson index are: 
) 1 ( G WG                                                                            (28) 
    )) ( 1 ( ) ( e I W e I                                                                       (29) 
  As a result of the simulations we obtain yearly pensions between 2007 and 2050, therefore 
the average pension and distributional and wel fare indexes are also computed by year. Since 
each generation of pensioners  shows different probability of survival through the simulation 
period, we must use a sort of weight to aggregate pensions of all existing pensioners in each 
year. This weight is simply the probability of survival from age 65 until each subsequent year, 
extracted from the mortality table. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average pension and the 
corresponding Gini coefficient11. The pensions grow through the period as a consequence of the 
capitalization process, particularly of the younger generation of insured who has more time to 
capitalize. At the beginning, the pensions computed without reform are higher than those of any 
other reform scenario, but since year 2019 the scenario with α=9% shows the highest pensions. 
In the case of the Gini, the scenario of no reform is always more unequal. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
  In order to ease the comparison of pension distributions from different scenarios and make 
explicit the trade-offs with the pension debt reduction, we use the averages of the pension mean 
and inequality and welfare indexes of the whole simulation period12. Table 4 shows inequality 
measures for each pension distribution derived from different contribution rates α. 
[Table 4 about here] 
  It is interesting to note how different the two pension systems transmit inequality from 
labour life to retirement. For instance, in the SNP the Gini coefficient for wages drops from 0.40 
to 0.12; this is simply explained by the system design on which the pension value must be 
within  a  minimum  and  maximum  value.  In  contrast,  in  the  SPP  the  wage  inequality  is 
transmitted to pensions, which is due to the individual capitalization scheme13. 
  The reform always reduces pension inequality when the distributional effect is analyzed with 
the Gini coefficient; and the inequality monotonically decreases as  α lowers. The same results 
are observed for the Atkinson index until e=0.5. Higher values of aversion to inequality lead to 
changes in the ranking of pension distributions. The best distribution in the ranking is one that 
shows less inequality according to the planner’s view. For this reason, a distribution may exhibit 
different positions for two planners that differ on their aversion to inequality. For example, a 
planner very averse to inequality (e=2.5) prefers the scenario with a contribution rate α=9%, 
while for a less averse planner (e=0.5), the best scenario is that one with α=1%. 14 
 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  pension  distribution  with  α=1%,  i.e.  the  maximum  rate  of 
contribution  to  the  solidarity  fund  among  all  distributions,  is  at  the  worst  position  of  the 
ranking  when  the  planner  is  highly  inequality  averse.  However,  this  result  is  not  entirely 
unexpected. As the aversion to inequality increases, it gives more weight to the bottom of the 
pension distribution; therefore, a distribution more inequality distributed at the end of the scale 
would be worst ranked (Atkinson, 1970). At the bottom of the pension distribution there are 
insured who obtain a minimum pension and who obtain a pension below such value; for the 
latter the pension value is even lower when the contribution rate for individual capitalization is 
low. This in turn leads to greater inequality in the bottom of the distribution of pensions. This is 
precisely what we observe through the coefficient of variation calculated in each decile of the 
pension distributions of table 5. Looking at the bottom of the pension distributions, there is less 
variation among the pensions as α increases. It is also noticeable that the reform prevents many 
pensioners of receiving a pension below the minimum. Without implementing the reform, 30% 
of the pensioners may receive a pension below the minimum; but such percentage might be only 
2.8% if the reform were implemented.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Likewise, the planner is able to rank the resulting pension distributions according to its 
welfare implications. As mentioned before, a SWF may be computed for each contribution rate 
α. For instance, by using the Gini criterion the contribution rate α=9% offers the best effects on 
welfare; and as this rate decreases, the position of the WFS in the ranking decreases (see table 
6). The SWF corresponding to the current scenario (without reform) is at the bottom of the 
ranking. 
[Table 6 about here] 
The ranking of the scenarios change slightly if the SWF are measured with the Atkinson 
criterion, except the current scenario of no reform, which presents a rather different position to 
that found with the Gini criterion. Since the effect of average pension on the SWF is larger than 
the effect of greater inequality, the scenario of no reform is not ranked too badly.  As 
mentioned  before,  the  planner  dislikes  inequality  at  the  bottom  of  the  distribution  in  the 
Atkinson index, thus lower values of α may be less preferred. 
Overall,  there  are  important  consequences  of  the  reform  on  the  pension  debt,  pension 
inequality and welfare. It is worth to present these effects all together in order to observe trade-
offs for policy-making. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 shows the effects of reform on pension debt, inequality and welfare according to the 
Gini criterion. As noted, any scenario of reform involves improvement in welfare and equity 
with respect to the current situation. If the planner is only interested in the effects on welfare, 15 
 
then he chooses the contribution rate α=9%, given that this scenario offers the highest level of 
welfare. However, this scenario increases the pension debt by US$245 million. In contrast, a 
planner more concerned with achieving greater reductions in the pension debt will choose a 
lower rate of contribution to the individual account, which will reduce inequality in pensions as 
well. Finally, if the criterion for choosing a scenario is to keep pensioners as well off as they 
would be with no reform, then the contribution rate α should be only 1%, which in turn implies 
the largest reduction of debt and the more equal pension distribution.  
These results change when using the Atkinson criterion. According to the left panel of figure 
3 (with e=0.5), the planner favours a contribution rate α slightly lower than 7% as this rate 
ensures at least the same welfare that would be there with no reform. Furthermore, it saves 
US$2,800  million  and  reduces  inequality.  Similarly,  in  the  right  panel  (with  e=2.5)  the  α 
preferred by the planner is between 5% and 6%, it generates savings between US$4,200 and 
US$5,500 million and also reduces inequality. However, if the first goal of the planner is to 
reduce inequality, then he prefers a contribution rate of α=9. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
In summary, there are several effects of the reform proposal and its relative importance 
depends on the planner's view. The trade-offs shown in this section are useful to instruct and 
highlight the different policy objectives and their interplay.  
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Although  the  values  assumed  for  the  parameters  of  the  simulation  are  based  mainly  on 
empirical evidence, it is instructive to show the sensibility of the simulation’s results to changes 
on  some  parameter  values.  Perhaps,  the  pension  fund  return  rate  (r ~ )  and  the  density  of 
contributions (t1) assumed are the most debatable values. In the appendix we can observe how 
the results on pension debt reduction, welfare and inequality vary due to changes on r ~  and t1. 
We allow   r ~  to vary between 4% and 8%, and t1 between 30% and 70%.  As we observe in 
tables A1 to A3, the results are much more sensitive to changes on the pension fund return rate 
than to density of contributions. A multi-pillar system leads to larger savings in pension debt 
when the pension fund return is higher. For instance, if the return rate is more than 6%, all 
things  equal,  a  reform  always  produces  reductions in  the  debt,  whatever the  value of  α.  In 
contrast, lower return rates limit the values of α that leads to debt decrease (see the cases of 
return rates of 4% and 5% in table A1). The same relations are observed for changes in the 
density  of  contributions,  although  the  size  of  the  variation  in  pension  debt  is  smaller.  This 
exercise is also interesting for policy makers because it allows identifying additional policies for 
enhancing gains from the reform; for example, policies oriented to encourage contribution and  
pension fund returns helps to obtain better results.   16 
 
  As expected, higher pension fund returns lead to larger pensions but also wider pension 
inequality. However, the welfare position corresponding to the scenario of no reform improves 
with  the  pension  fund  return.  This  in  turn,  imposes  limits  for  the  value  of  α  under  which 
pensioners may be as well off as they would be with no reform. For instance the scenario of no 
reform is ranked in fourth place (under Gini criterion) when the pension fund return is 8%, thus 
α must be larger than 6% in order to obtain a pension distribution with at least the same 
welfare level. Changes in density of contributions lead to the same relations in distributional 
and welfare measures but with a remarkably less importance.  
4.4 The third pillar 
So far the reform analysis has focused on the effects of first and second pillar as these are 
mandatory and are the basis on which the new pension system is sustained.  The third pillar is 
voluntary and is intended for workers willing to save more in order to obtain better pensions. In 
general,  low-income  individuals  might  not  be  interested  in  this  scheme  because  they  must 
allocate its limited resources on more immediate needs. The third pillar should be designed to 
alleviate rigidities of first and second pillar (Holzmann et al, 2005). This may attract individuals 
who  are  already  enrolled  in  the  pension  system,  and  even  those  who  are  not  insured  (e.g. 
professional self-employed workers) and willing to participate if incentives are adequate in 
their view.   
  A possible scheme is fixing a wage ceiling to charge the AFP’s administrative fee (recall that 
the fee is a fixed percentage of the insured’s monthly salary). So, the insured that earn more 
than that ceiling and choose the third pillar will pay the fee only up to the ceiling. In addition, 
the AFP may establish other fee schema for those who earn less than the ceiling or who are not 
enrolled in the pension system. It is expected to find resistance in the AFP as the main portion of 
its  revenues  relies  on  the  fees charged  to  high-income  insured.  But  it  is  also  true  that  our 
proposed  reform  would increase  significantly  the  number  of  its contributors  (those coming 
from SNP) and revenues. In December 2006, there were 1.4 and 0.57 million contributors in the 
SPP and SNP respectively; which means that, at the reform date, the number of AFP contributors 
would rise by 40%. This increase contrasts sharply with the yearly growth rate of the number of 
contributors noticed until December 2006, which was only 8.2%. Furthermore, if we keep the 
administrative fee (in average this is 1.8075% of wages), the multi-pillar system would allow 
the AFP to increase its revenues by 23%, which is larger than the yearly growth rate of AFP 
revenues (8.1% between 1997 and 2006). Table 7 shows the potential gains for the AFP. 
[Table 7 about here] 
  Implementing  the  reform  without  the  third  pillar,  the  AFP’s  revenues  may  potentially 
increase by S/.116.5 million; but imposing a wage ceiling for the charging of fees of S/.6,000 a 
month would reduce revenues by 38 million. As wage ceiling rises, AFP find positive variation in 17 
 
its total revenues. For instance, a ceiling of S/.10,000 would increase revenues by S/.21 million. 
The second column of table 7 shows the variation on AFP’s revenues if the fee scheme of the 
third pillar is varied slightly. Instead of charging no fee beyond wage ceiling, the AFP can charge 
half the fee, i.e. 0.90375%. By this way, the revenues are reduced less than in the first fee 
scheme. For example, a ceiling of S/.10,000 would raise revenues by S/.68.7 million. 
  Although  the  arrival  of  insured  from  the  SNP  increases  AFP’s  administrative  costs,  this 
increase should not be directly proportional to the number of new insured due to the existence 
of economies of scale in the pension fund industry (Galarza & Olivera, 2001). Therefore, it is 
feasible to set a fee schedule for the third pillar without an increase of fees. In addition, the third 
pillar would be open to non-enrolled workers and insured who earn less than the ceiling, which 
would allow AFP to collect extra fees and revenues. The setting of this fee may also serve as an 
additional vehicle for competition among AFP. 
  On  the  other  hand,  the  AFP  would  no  longer  have  a  system  competitor  (the  SNP)  for 
recruiting new workers, which ensures a better and broader base of contributors. Moreover, the 
AFP are very profitable firms that already recovered their initial investment as is seen in their 
high profits and large levels of Return on Equity obtained during last years, even higher than in 
other Latin American pension systems (World Bank, 2004). Among Peruvian industries, the AFP 
industry is the sector with best returns (Gerens, 2006). 
4.5 Organizational aspects of the reform 
 Organizational aspects of the reform are beyond the scope of our proposal but may have 
interesting  effects.  For  example,  insured  of  the  SNP  could  choose  any  AFP  or  could  be 
“assigned”, by any criterion, to each of these firms. In the first case, firms would compete for 
those insured (over 600 thousand contributors in the SNP at Dec-2007); although instead of 
competing  via  fees  reductions,  they  could  compete  via  advertising,  sellers  or  gifts,  which 
increase administrative expenses. The second case prevents the increase of administrative costs 
but does not ensure the reduction of fees. Another option is to offer the entire group of SNP 
insured  to  a  new  AFP  through  a  tender  (choosing  the  offer  with  the  lowest  fee).  Some 
companies might be interested in this scheme as they can avoid the high sunk costs of starting 
business, that are typical in the pension funds industry. In turn, this fee should be lower than 
that of the rest of AFP and influence them to bring down their own fees. We do not address the 
design  characteristics  of  the  tender,  but  this  should  minimally  include  clauses  of  temporal 
loyalty for the SNP insured and the commitment not to raise the fee agreed for a certain period. 
Although politically risky and controversial, the State might create a governmental AFP with the 
automatic inclusion of all insured from the SNP; and its management and regulation would be 
identical to those of the AFP. In this case, the fee charged by the Government might work as a 
mechanism to reduce fees of the other AFP. 18 
 
Undoubtedly,  the  reform  proposal  opens  up  many  possibilities  to  improve  the  pension 
system in areas not considered in the proposal itself, particularly in the fee charged by the AFP. 
In this sense, another form to organize the reform might just be the negotiation between the 
AFP and the State with the aim to reduce the fee in exchange for the insured of the SNP. There is 
no analysis on the characteristics of the solidarity fund, but it may be administrated by the AFP 
or other private firms specialized in funds management. Again, a tender offer for this fund could 
enhance conditions for its administration. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The multi-pillar system proposed enables to reinstate the principle of solidarity in the Peruvian 
pension  system.  Peruvian  workers  are  not  unfamiliar  to  this  social  security  principle.  The 
pension system that prevailed before the establishment of individual capitalization was the SNP, 
a system that includes, by design, the principle of solidarity. Moreover, the insured of the SPP 
contributed,  until  1995,  1%  of  their  wages  as  a  solidarity  contribution  to  IPSS  (Peruvian 
Institute of Social Security), which was the predecessor of the ONP. 
As is clear from our proposal, solidarity is a valued characteristic in social security in general, 
and particularly in a pension system. Furthermore, the recovery of this principle allows us to 
use the pension system as an additional tool for income redistribution.  
It is worth to mention that a multi-pillar system may diversify risks better. The factors that 
affect labour variables and hence the first pillar are not perfectly correlated with factors that 
affect financial variables, which in turn determine the pension funds performance in the second 
pillar (Holzman et al, 2005; Lindbeck and Persson, 2003). 
The proposal has three important effects. First, pension inequality is notably reduced, which 
breaks the transmission of inequality from labour income to pensions. Second, the reform is 
welfare enhancing, although it depends on the value of the contribution rate chosen for the 
individual account. And in third place, pension debt is importantly reduced. The key aspect of 
our results is that the proposed reform shows improvements in all these three issues. However, 
we acknowledge the existence of possible behavioural adjustments (e.g. in the labour market), 
which are not accounted for in our simulation results due to data limitations.  
As minimum pensions are financed by contributions from insured rather than transfers from 
the Treasury, the State would allocate these freed resources to other social programs, which 
enhances the social spending. Furthermore, the implementation of a minimum pension scheme 
gives the same rights to all insured whether these come from SPP or SNP. The proposed third 
pillar  may  attract  high-income  insured  and  workers  who  are  not  obligated  to  enrol  in  the 
pension system due to rigidities of the first and second pillar. It is expected that AFP will not 
increase their fees due to the existence of economies of scale in the pension fund industry and 19 
 
the fact that the SNP will no longer be a competitor. Indeed, the creation of a third pillar is 
another mean for promoting competition among AFP. For these reasons, the reform proposal 
may also be thought of as an opportunity to bring down administrative fees.  20 
 
Endnotes
                                                 
1 The SPP is supervised by the Superintendence of Banking and Insurance (SBS), whilst that the SNP is 
administrated by the Bureau of Pensions (ONP). 
2  The Government may modify parameters and pension rules, but within reasonable limits. But   the 
imbalance is so large that this policy is not effective. For instance, if the contribution rate is the unique 
adjustable parameter, this would rise up to the impracticable rate of 43.8% to balance the system. 
3 Only in 2007, the SNP’s pension roll assumed by the State was S/. 2,455 million, i.e. 0.73% of the GDP. 
4 The contribution rate in the SPP and SNP is 10% and 13% of salary, respectively. In addition, the AFP 
charges an administrative fee and collects the insurance premium that covers the risks o f disability and 
death. The fee and insurance premium are 1.81% and 0.88% on average, respectively. Overall, the insured 
of the SPP and SNP pay a rather similar percentage of their wage. 
5 We estimate the enrolment age of the SNP’s insured since this variable is not included in our sample. For 
this purpose, we use the database PRIESO (conducted by the World Bank in Lima Metropolitana during 
May  2002,  see  Barr  and  Packard  (2005)).  The  dependent  variable  was  the  enrolment  age  and  the 
independents were the current age (at May 2002) and its square, broken by gender. The corresponding 
coefficients were used to impute the enrolment age for the individuals of our SNP sample. We prefer this 
method to that of assuming a fixed number of contributions for all insured (which is used by the ONP to 
calculate the SNP’s actuarial liability) because there are important differences in the enrolment age due to 
the gender and cohort.  
6 An insured of the SPP will receive a minimum pension within this system if he was previously  enrolled 
in the SNP -before the creation date of the SPP- and contributed at least 20 years to any of both systems.  
7 The average age difference between the heads  of household under 65 years and their  wives is  3.6 
according to the National Household Survey (ENAHO-2006). 
8 These figures correspond to annuities (life, deferred and guaranteed) in Dollars and obtained at the legal 
retirement age in Dec-2006, Dec-2007 and Oct-2008. The information on annuities in Dollars is enough to 
have an idea on the value o f the interest rate because the majority of retirees choose this currency 
(around 98% of the annuities were given in Dollars). 
9 It means that  % 50 1 1 0 1 0
mix spp spp snp snp t t t t t . 
10 For instance, since 2007 the ONP uses a mortality table with higher longevity. In the n ew table (SP-
2005), 65 year old males and females are expected to live 18.06 and 24.79 additional years, respectively. 
In contrast, the previous  table (RV-85) forecasts 17.15 and 20.71 for males and females, respectively. 
Likewise, since 2007 the ONP assumes that the insured contributes up to 27 years, instead of 33 years. 
11 In this figure and henceforth, pension average and inequality and welfare measures refers to insured 
who retire at 65 years old. 
12 Although also arbitrary, the social planner may use other reference points such as pick up a particular 
year of the simulation period or the very last year. At least, the average over the whole simulation period 
includes all the changes in pensions and inequality over a considerable period. 
13 Without weighting pensions with the survival probability, the Gini coefficient for pensions in the SPP is 
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Some indicators by country 
Country  Reform 
Year 










Δ in Gini  
[a-b] 
Argentina  1994  2006  0.444  0.336  0.108  -2.5  20.7 
Bolivia  1997  2005  0.562  0.259  0.303  -3.5  10.5 
Colombia  1994  2004  0.513  0.405  0.108  -1.6  22.2 
Costa Rica  2001  2006  0.454  0.559  -0.105   0.0  46.6 
Dominican Rep.  2003-2006  2006  0.484  0.486  -0.002    n.a.  14.5 
El Salvador  1998  2005  0.468  0.392  0.076  -1.4  20.1 
Mexico  1997  2006  0.509  0.489  0.020  -0.5  28.0 
Peru  1993  2006  0.519  0.339  0.180  -0.7  12.0 
Uruguay  1996  2005  0.501  0.449  0.052  -4.0  58.8 
Source: Gasparini et al (2009) for Gini coefficients; the Gini for Peru is based on own calculations using Enaho-
2006 at national level. Arenas de Mesa & Mesa-Lago (2006) for coverage of Economically active population 
(active contributors to private and public systems, at 2004) and fiscal costs (Current pension deficit: benefit 








Actuarial liability of the SNP (US$ millions) 





of contrib. (c) 
Net position 
(a)+(b)-(c) 
“Pension debt”  
(b)-(c) 
ONP’s estimation: 
   
     
2004  8,846  15,449  6,579  17,717  8,870 
2005  9,390  16,239  7,142  18,487  9,097 
2006       10,606  19,318  9,360  20,564  9,958 
2007       12,653  24,272         11,038  25,887          13,234 
Author’s estimation: 
   
     
2006  n.a.  14,255  4,550  n.a.  9,704 








Pension debt with and without reform (US$ millions) 
No Reform                            
a. Present value of contributions  4,550 
                b. Act. liability for SNP insured  14,255 
                c. Act. liability for SPP insured  592 
                d. Pension debt: c+b-a  10,296 
               
                   
With Reform  Contribution rate to individual account 
α=1%  α=2%  α=3%  α=4%  α=5%  α=6%  α=7%  α=8%  α=9% 
e. Present value of contributions  20,763  18,456  16,149  13,842  11,535  9,228  6,921  4,614  2,307 
f. Act. liability for insured  21,204  19,803  18,522  17,354  16,284  15,305  14,412  13,595  12,848 
g. Pension debt: f-e  441  1,347  2,373  3,512  4,749  6,077  7,491  8,981  10,541 
                    Debt reduction: d-g  9,855  8,949  7,923  6,784  5,547  4,219  2,805  1,315  -245 





No Reform  Pensions     Wages       
SNP  SPP  Total     SNP  SPP  Total       
    Mean  566.2  827.2  775.9 
 
1003  1562.1  1446.4 
        Gini  0.117  0.563  0.488 
 
0.397  0.507  0.496 
        I(e=0.1)  0.004  0.062  0.050 
                I(e=0.5)  0.018  0.270  0.215 
                I(e=1.0)  0.010  0.313  0.204 
                I(e=2.0)  0.057  0.696  0.634 
                I(e=2.5)  0.067  0.770  0.725 
           
                    With Reform  Pensions 
α=1%  α=2%  α=3%  α=4%  α=5%  α=6%  α=7%  α=8%  α=9% 
    Mean  640.6  655.1  670.5  686.9  704.0  721.8  740.3  759.5  779.2 
    Gini  0.351  0.361  0.371  0.380  0.390  0.398  0.406  0.414  0.421 
    I(e=0.1)  0.036  0.037  0.038  0.039  0.040  0.041  0.042  0.042  0.043 
    I(e=0.5)  0.156  0.159  0.163  0.166  0.170  0.173  0.177  0.180  0.183 
    I(e=1.0)  0.199  0.190  0.184  0.179  0.175  0.171  0.168  0.165  0.162 
    I(e=2.0)  0.659  0.621  0.600  0.588  0.580  0.575  0.571  0.569  0.568 
    I(e=2.5)  0.814  0.764  0.736  0.717  0.704  0.695  0.688  0.683  0.679 




Coefficient of variation of pensions and % of insured with minimum pension 
  No reform    With reform 
   SNP  SPP  Total 
 
α=1%  α=2%  α=3%  α=4%  α=5%  α=6%  α=7%  α=8%  α=9% 
Coefficient of variation (x100): 
   Decile 1 (poorest)  0.0  38.5  37.8 
 
49.1  48.4  47.6  46.9  46.2  45.6  45.0  44.4  43.8 
   Decile 2  0.0  11.0  11.2 
 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   Decile 3  0.0  7.1  8.2 
 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   Decile 4  0.0  5.4  0.0 
 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   Decile 5  0.0  5.5  0.3 
 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   Decile 6  0.0  5.6  6.2 
 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  2.8  5.2 
   Decile 7  0.0  6.4  6.5 
 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  3.6  6.3  6.9  6.8  6.7 
   Decile 8  0.2  9.0  8.1 
 
2.6  6.0  8.7  9.0  8.8  8.6  8.5  8.4  8.4 
   Decile 9  12.6  14.5  15.3 
 
15.9  16.1  15.9  15.6  15.5  15.4  15.3  15.1  15.0 
   Decile 10 (richest)  8.0  73.6  78.0 
 
87.2  85.2  83.4  82.0  80.8  80.0  79.3  78.7  78.3 
   Total  26.6  147.5  146.0 
 
117.9  120.6  123.3  125.8  128.2  130.5  132.5  134.3  136.0 
                           Percentage of insured with minimum pension: 
< min. pen.  0.0  37.6  29.9 
 
2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8 
= min. pen.  79.6  3.6  19.2 
 
74.5  71.9  69.0  65.9  62.7  59.5  56.3  53.1  50.1 




Ranking of social welfare functions 
SWF  α=1%  α=2%  α=3%  α=4%  α=5%  α=6  α=7%  α=8%  α=9%  (No reform) 
Gini  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  10 
I(e=0.1)  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  1  2 
I(e=0.5)  10  9  8  7  6  5  3  2  1  4 
I(e=1.0)  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  2  1  3 
I(e=2.0)  10  9  8  7  5  4  3  2  1  6 
I(e=2.5)  10  9  8  7  6  4  3  2  1  5 






Administrative fee Revenues (S/. millions, Dec-2006) 
With Reform 
    Administrative fee revenues from SNP’s insured  116.5 
  Administrative fee revenues from SPP’s insured  505.7 
  Total administrative fee revenues  622.2 
  With reform and third pillar 
    Variation in total administrative fee revenues 
 
with mg. rate=0.9%: 
            With wage ceiling of S/. 6,000  -38.1  39.2 
            With wage ceiling of S/. 7,000  -17.9  49.3 
            With wage ceiling of S/. 8,000  -1.9  57.3 
            With wage ceiling of S/. 9,000  10.5  63.5 
            With wage ceiling of S/.10,000  21.0  68.7 
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Appendix: sensitivity analysis 
 
Table A1 
Sensitivity of pension debt reduction (US$ millions) 
 
   Contribution rate to individual account 
   α=1%  α=2%  α=3%  α=4%  α=5%  α=6%  α=7%  α=8%  α=9% 
Pension fund return rate                       
4%  6,851  5,774  4,627  3,416  2,142  814  -567  -2,003  -3,491 
5%  8,331  7,349  6,278  5,120  3,882  2,568  1,182  -268  -1,782 
6%  9,855  8,949  7,923  6,784  5,547  4,219  2,805  1,315  -245 
7%  11,300  10,454  9,456  8,325  7,072  5,713  4,256  2,712  1,085 
8%  12,618  11,832  10,857  9,716  8,433  7,025  5,499  3,873  2,164 
Density of contributions (t1) 
              30%  9,060  8,218  7,264  6,205  5,054  3,818  2,500  1,109  -350 
40%  9,265  8,401  7,425  6,344  5,171  3,911  2,571  1,156  -326 
50%  9,855  8,949  7,923  6,784  5,547  4,219  2,805  1,315  -245 
60%  11,533  10,524  9,367  8,075  6,667  5,149  3,536  1,837  63 
70%  13,723  12,581  11,254  9,765  8,135  6,376  4,510  2,547  491 
Source: Author’s simulation               
 
Table A2 
Sensitivity of inequality and welfare measures to pension fund return rate (r ~ )  
 
  No 
reform 
Contribution rate to individual account 
  α=1%  α=2%  α=3%  α=4%  α=5%  α=6%  α=7%  α=8%  α=9% 
Pension mean              4%  628.2  571.6  580.7  590.5  600.8  611.6  622.8  634.5  646.6  659.2 
5%  694.4  601.0  612.4  624.6  637.4  650.9  665.0  679.7  694.9  710.6 
6%  775.9  640.6  655.1  670.5  686.9  704.0  721.8  740.3  759.5  779.2 
7%  876.5  694.2  712.7  732.4  753.1  774.7  797.2  820.4  844.2  868.7 
8%  1001.1  765.8  789.3  814.1  840.2  867.3  895.4  924.3  953.9  984.2 
Gini coefficient              4%  0.471  0.288  0.297  0.306  0.315  0.324  0.333  0.342  0.351  0.359 
5%  0.479  0.317  0.327  0.337  0.346  0.356  0.365  0.374  0.383  0.391 
6%  0.488  0.351  0.361  0.371  0.380  0.390  0.398  0.406  0.414  0.421 
7%  0.499  0.388  0.397  0.406  0.415  0.423  0.430  0.437  0.443  0.449 
8%  0.515  0.425  0.433  0.441  0.448  0.455  0.461  0.466  0.471  0.475 
Atkinson index (e=0.5)              4%  0.202  0.128  0.130  0.133  0.136  0.139  0.143  0.146  0.150  0.153 
5%  0.208  0.141  0.144  0.147  0.150  0.154  0.158  0.161  0.165  0.168 
6%  0.215  0.156  0.159  0.163  0.166  0.170  0.173  0.177  0.180  0.183 
7%  0.222  0.173  0.177  0.180  0.183  0.186  0.190  0.192  0.195  0.198 
8%  0.231  0.192  0.194  0.197  0.200  0.203  0.205  0.207  0.210  0.211 
Atkinson index (e=2.5)              4%  0.709  0.805  0.746  0.712  0.688  0.671  0.659  0.649  0.642  0.637 
5%  0.715  0.808  0.753  0.722  0.701  0.686  0.675  0.667  0.661  0.656 
6%  0.725  0.814  0.764  0.736  0.717  0.704  0.695  0.688  0.683  0.679 
7%  0.737  0.825  0.779  0.754  0.737  0.726  0.717  0.711  0.706  0.702 
8%  0.779  0.874  0.838  0.816  0.799  0.787  0.778  0.770  0.764  0.759 
Ranking of SWF with Gini              4%  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
5%  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
6%  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
7%  7  10  9  8  6  5  4  3  2  1 
8%  4  10  9  8  7  6  5  3  2  1 
Ranking of SWF with Atkin. e=0.5              4%  9  10  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
5%  6  10  9  8  7  5  4  3  2  1 
6%  4  10  9  8  7  6  5  3  2  1 
7%  2  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  1 
8%  2  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  1 
Ranking of SWF with Atkin. e=2.5              4%  7  10  9  8  6  5  4  3  2  1 
5%  6  10  9  8  7  5  4  3  2  1 
6%  5  10  9  8  7  6  4  3  2  1 
7%  4  10  9  8  7  6  5  3  2  1 
8%  3  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  2  1 






Sensitivity of inequality and welfare measures to density of contributions (t1) 
 
  No 
reform 
Contribution rate to individual account 
  α=1%  α=2%  α=3%  α=4%  α=5%  α=6%  α=7%  α=8%  α=9% 
Pension mean              30%  764.6  639.3  652.8  667.3  682.6  698.6  715.3  732.7  750.7  769.2 
40%  768.1  639.7  653.5  668.3  684.0  700.3  717.4  735.1  753.4  772.3 
50%  775.9  640.6  655.1  670.5  686.9  704.0  721.8  740.3  759.5  779.2 
60%  795.5  642.0  657.9  675.0  693.0  712.0  731.9  752.4  773.7  795.5 
70%  821.6  643.8  661.5  680.6  700.9  722.3  744.7  767.9  791.9  816.5 
Gini coefficient              30%  0.487  0.351  0.361  0.370  0.379  0.388  0.396  0.404  0.412  0.419 
40%  0.487  0.351  0.361  0.370  0.380  0.389  0.397  0.405  0.412  0.419 
50%  0.488  0.351  0.361  0.371  0.380  0.390  0.398  0.406  0.414  0.421 
60%  0.490  0.352  0.363  0.373  0.383  0.393  0.402  0.411  0.418  0.426 
70%  0.491  0.352  0.364  0.376  0.387  0.397  0.407  0.415  0.423  0.431 
Atkinson index (e=0.5)              30%  0.214  0.156  0.160  0.163  0.166  0.170  0.173  0.176  0.179  0.182 
40%  0.214  0.156  0.160  0.163  0.166  0.170  0.173  0.176  0.180  0.183 
50%  0.215  0.156  0.159  0.163  0.166  0.170  0.173  0.177  0.180  0.183 
60%  0.215  0.156  0.160  0.164  0.167  0.171  0.175  0.178  0.182  0.185 
70%  0.216  0.156  0.160  0.164  0.169  0.173  0.177  0.180  0.184  0.187 
Atkinson index (e=2.5)              30%  0.740  0.840  0.792  0.763  0.744  0.730  0.720  0.712  0.706  0.702 
40%  0.731  0.826  0.776  0.748  0.729  0.715  0.705  0.698  0.692  0.688 
50%  0.725  0.814  0.764  0.736  0.717  0.704  0.695  0.688  0.683  0.679 
60%  0.722  0.805  0.755  0.728  0.710  0.698  0.690  0.683  0.679  0.675 
70%  0.720  0.797  0.748  0.722  0.705  0.694  0.687  0.681  0.677  0.674 
Ranking of SWF with Gini              30%  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
40%  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
50%  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
60%  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
70%  9  10  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
Ranking of SWF with Atkin. e=0.5              30%  4  10  9  8  7  6  5  3  2  1 
40%  4  10  9  8  7  6  5  3  2  1 
50%  4  10  9  8  7  6  5  3  2  1 
60%  3  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  2  1 
70%  3  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  2  1 
Ranking of SWF with Atkin. e=2.5              30%  5  10  9  8  7  6  4  3  2  1 
40%  5  10  9  8  7  6  4  3  2  1 
50%  5  10  9  8  7  6  4  3  2  1 
60%  5  10  9  8  7  6  4  3  2  1 
70%  5  10  9  8  7  6  4  3  2  1 
Source: Author’s simulation             
 
 